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(COMOR-D-24/83)
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
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Proposal for Revision in Statement of Requirements
for High-Altitude Photographic Coverage of Cuba

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41.14/53 (COMOR-D-24/68), 2 July 1963,
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At the request of COMOR, the attached proposal of that Committee on the subject has been scheduled on the agenda of the 11 September USIB meeting for consideration and action on the COMOR recommendation in paragraph 5.



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Colonel, USAF
Acting Executive Secretary

Declassification Review by NGA

Attachment

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USIB-D-41.14/66
(COMOR-D-24/83)Proposal for Revision of Statement of Requirements for High-Altitude
Photographic Coverage of Cuba

1. On 19 August 1963, a review of the status of Soviet forces in Cuba, prepared for the USIB by an ad hoc interdepartmental committee, concluded that Soviet forces in Cuba are in a state of transition and continuing reduction, that Soviet troops are now largely engaged in the training of Cuban forces, and that Soviet weapons are in the process of being transferred to Cuban control. Furthermore, a continuing review of reporting from all sources has revealed no verifiable evidence of the retention or reintroduction of strategic missiles or IL-28 bombers since those weapons were withdrawn from Cuba last fall.

2. On 2 July, responsive to a request by SAC that it be permitted more leeway in conducting high-level reconnaissance of Cuba, USIB recognized the adverse weather situation and approved the SAC program. Concurrently, it directed COMOR to make a biweekly report during this bad weather period. A resume of this report is given below.

<u>PERIOD COVERED</u>	<u>FLIGHTS</u>	<u>COVERAGE WITH 25% OR LESS CLOUD COVER</u>	<u>GROSS ISLAND COVERAGE (Targets not Covered of Approximately 185 Targets)</u>	<u>COVERAGE OF HIGHEST PRIORITY (Targets not covered of 28 Targets)</u>
27Jun- 3Jul	7	69%	6	1
4Jul- 10Jul	7	87%	12	1
11Jul- 17Jul	6	48%	19	7
18Jul- 24Jul	8	73%	7	2
25Jul- 31Jul	7	66%	7	0
1Aug- 7Aug	5	58%	36	10
8Aug- 14Aug	6	81%	2	0
15Aug- 21Aug	6	57%	6	0
22Aug- 28Aug	7	75%	2	1

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USIB-D-41,14/66
(COMOR-D-24/83)

3. COMOR notes that even during the bad weather period SAC never encountered any 2-week period where poor coverage in the first week was not immediately compensated for by greatly increased coverage in the next week. This pattern applies equally to area coverage and to coverage of the highest priority targets. The 11 through 17 July period, for instance, was poor but on 24 July, based on a preliminary report of the 18 through 24 July period, the Chairman noted at USIB that SAC had taken advantage of favorable weather and hoped it would continue to do so. The record seems to show that it did. It should be noted that in achieving satisfactory results during this period missions were not flown on 5 days and it was only during the week of 18 through 24 July that 2 were flown on one day. The general impact of the foregoing figures suggests that SAC could well operate on a formula designed to achieve a specified amount of coverage during a 2-week period rather than on a weekly basis.

4. In its analysis of the current requirements problem, COMOR has defined these specific intelligence problems in Cuba:

- a. The development or re-emergence of a strategic threat to the United States;
- b. The development of a capability to attack Guantanamo or indications of the initiation of such an attack;
- c. The development of a capability or indications of activities to attack or mount clandestine activities against some Latin American countries.

5. Recommendation: That our requirements for high-level reconnaissance to provide information bearing upon the problems stated in para 4 above can be met under the following formula:

- a. Coverage of the entire territory of Cuba every 14 days, insuring coverage of the highest priority targets (numbering about 30).
- b. Areas and objectives which have not been adequately covered during the specified time period will be defined by COMOR and will take precedence in operational planning, for the next time period.

USIB-D-41.14/66
COMOR-D-24/83

c. Specific coverage of critical targets when photography or collateral warrant.

d. The coverage of the whole territory should be accomplished at such time as to maximize the chances for achievement with the fewest number of missions.



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